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SOME MARITAL DEDUCTION PROBLEMS
FOR THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAWYER
JOHN C. BRUTON*
1. USE OF THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
As we know, the Code of Internal Revenue (§ 2056) since
1948 has allowed a special deduction in computing a taxable
estate, of any amount up to 50% of the adjusted gross estate'
which passes from a decedent to a surviving spouse.2 Section
2056(a) which allows the deduction, reads as follows:
Allowance of Marital Deduction. For purposes of the tax
imposed by section 2001, the value of the taxable estate
shall, * * * be determined by deducting from the value of
the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest
in property which passes or has passed from the decedent
to his surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such
interest is included in determining the value of the gross
estate.
The deduction may be in the form of a specific bequest or
devise to a surviving spouse or it may be a fractional interest
in the entire estate or in the residuary estate, despite the fact
that the assets are unidentified, but the total deduction cannot
exceed 50% of the adjusted gross estate. The purpose of Con-
gress in allowing this deduction was to place common law states
upon an equal basis with community property states, thus
achieving "geographical" equalization.3 Since the theory of
* Boyd, Bruton, Knowlton and Tate, Columbia, South Carolina.
1. Which is defined, generally, as the gross estate less funeral and adminis-
trative expenses, debts, charitable bequests or devises and losses, less any
community property in the estate. See § 2056 (c) (2) (A).
2. It makes no difference, in this regard, whether the property passes under
a will or by intestacy. The IRS agrees that a widow's dower passes to her
from the decedent but whenever dower consists of a life interest in property, as
in S. C., the IRS refuses to allow it on the ground that it is a terminable in-
terest. United States v. Crosby, 257 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1958). However, if
the property cannot be partitioned but has to be sold by the executor so that
the widow's dower may be paid in cash, the interest may be allowed. Jackson
v. United States, 292 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1961). There is a split of authority
as to whether a widow's allowance will qualify but the IRS later took the
view that it is a terminal interest. P. D. Rensenhouse, 31 T.C. 818 (1959).
Amounts paid to widows in settlement of will contents and the like may be
allowed if they are not terminable interests. L. J. Sutcher, 34 T.C. 918 (1960) ;
J. P. Barrett, 22 T.C. 606 (1954) ; T. W. Tebb, 27 T.C. 671 (1957). A cash
settlement for a terminable interest will not be allowed. Chritton v. U.S., 59-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 11, 883 (N.D. Ill.).
3. See MERTEN, LAW OF GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION, § 29.01 (1959).
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community property is that all property acquired by either
husband or wife during the marriage (except property acquired
as the separate property of either) is the result of a kind of
marital partnership, only one-half of the family owned property
is considered owned by the first spouse to die. The marital de-
duction was designed to allow the same result in the case where
the decedent lived in a non-community property state. Tax
savings in the estate of the first spouse to die may be very sub-
stantial. Commerce Clearing House4 estimates the maximum
savings as shown:
Maximum Maximum
Size of Savings Size of Savings
Estate Possible Estate Possible
$ 100,000 $ 4,800 $1,500,000 $ 290,800
150,000 16,850 2,000,000 422,700
200,000 27,900 2,500,000 569,000
250,000 36,800 3,000,000 128,400
300,000 44,800 4,000,000 1,076,600
400,000 61,800 5,000,000 1,461,600
500,000 78,800 6,000,000 1,866,600
600,000 97,000 7,000,000 2,286,600
700,000 116,200 8,000,000 2,721,600
800,000 135,200 9,000,000 3,167,200
900,000 156,000 10,000,000 3,612,200
1,000,000 177,000
These estimates of maximum possible savings are seldom
reached as they assume that the surviving spouse had absolutely
no estate of her own and that the first spouse left her the exact
amount of the marital deduction. Nevertheless, the marital de-
duction does result in substantial benefits, and is a most impor-
tant factor in estate planning.
It must, however, be used with discretion. If it is used to
reduce the estate of the first spouse although the surviving
spouse has a substantial estate of her own, the overall estate
taxes might be considerably greater than would otherwise be the
case. Despite this increase in overall taxes, it is possible that
because of a shortage of cash in the estate of the first spouse
it might be desirable to use the marital deduction to the greatest
extent possible so as to reduce the tax in the estate of the first
spouse. Nevertheless, if there is no over-riding consideration
4. 2 CCH FED. EST. & GiFT TAX REP. § 7155 (1960).
1961]
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of liquidity, unless it is expected that the second spouse will live
for many years after the death of the first spouse, or will give
away a substantial part of the property left to her, the problem
should be one of equalizing the two estates.
2. A TERMINABLE INTEREST IN THE SURVIVING
SPOUSE WILL NOT QUALIFY FOR THE MARITAL
DEDUCTION
As we have seen, the original purpose of the marital de-
duction was to equalize the tax in non-community property states
with the tax in community property states-where the spouses
owned the family property equally. The property interest,
therefore, of the surviving spouse had to be "ownership" of its
equivalent. Thus, Congress provided that the property passing
to a surviving spouse could not qualify for the marital deduc-
tion if it created a terminable or conditional interest.5 This is
known as the "terminable interest" rule.
Congress recognized, however, that it might be unwise to
leave outright to a widow without investment experience a large
amount of property, free from any restraint. The Code of In-
ternal Revenue, therefore, as originally enacted in 1948, allowed
as a basic exception to the terminable interest rule the creation
of a trust for the surviving spouse if she received all of the
income or earnings therefrom and was given a specific power of
appointment over the principal exercisable in favor of herself
(during life) or her estate (after death). Congress also allowed
insurance payable to the surviving spouse to qualify if she re-
ceived all earnings from the fund (or earnings and principal
was paid to her as an annuity) and if she had the right to with-
draw principal during her life or had a similar power of appoint-
ment.6 However, after several cases1 held that a life bequest
to a surviving spouse, with requisite power of appointment,
failed to qualify for the marital deduction since there was no
5. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) setting forth this limitation on
the applicability of the marital deduction.
6. An exemption was also allowed from the terminable interest rule in that
the surviving spouse could be required to survive the decedent by as long as
six months before she qualified for the bequest.
7. Pipe v. United States, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1957); McGehee v. United
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trust created, the exception was broadened8 to include a life
estate, whether or not in trust, and in 1958 this was made retro-
active to 1948.
The question frequently arises, in the life estate with power
of appointment, as to whether the power is sufficiently broad to
qualify the property passing to the surviving spouse for the
marital deduction. The statute merely provides that the power
must be exercisable in favor of the surviving spouse or her estate
and must be exercisable alone and in all events.9 The fRegula-
tionl" is more detailed and states:
Power of appointment in surviving spouse. (1) The con-
ditions set forth in paragraph (a) (3) and (4) of this sec-
tion, that is, that the surviving spouse must have a power
of appointment exercisable in favor of herself or her estate
and exercisable alone and in all events, are not met unless
the power of the surviving spouse to appoint the entire
interest or a specific portion of it falls within one of the
following categories:
(i) A power so to appoint fully exercisable in her own
favor at any time following the decedent's death (as, for
example, an unlimited power to invade); or
(ii) A power so to appoint exercisable in favor of her
estate. Such a power, if exercisable during life, must be
fully exercisable at any time during life, or, if exercisable
by will, must be fully exercisable irrespective of the time of
her death (subject in either case to the provisions of § 20.
2056(b)-3, relating to interests conditioned on survival for
a limited period); or
(iii) A combination of the powers described under sub-
paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this subparagraph. For example
8. The Senate Committee Report on the 1954 Code states:
Present law requires * * * that the property be placed in trust and because
of doubt under the law of the various states as to what constitutes a "trust",
it is not clear when a life estate will qualify as a trust. Nor is it clear
where property is placed in trust and the surviving spouse has an income
interest in and power of appointment over part of the property, when the
interest given the surviving spouse constitutes a transfer in trust qualifying
for the martial deduction.
The bill (1954 CIR) makes it clear that property in a legal life estate,
as well as property in trust, qualifies for the marital deduction and that a
right to income plus a general power of appointment over only an individual
part of the property will qualify that part of the property for the marital
deduction.
9. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 2056(b) (5).
10. U. S. TREAs. R;. § 20.2056(b) (5) (g) (1954).
1964]
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the surviving spouse may, until she attains the age of 50
years, have a power to appoint to herself and thereafter
have a power to appoint to her estate. However, the con-
dition that the spouse's power must be exercisable in all
events is not satisfied unless irrespective of when the sur-
viving spouse may die the entire interest or a specific por-
tion of it will at the time of her death be subject to one
power or the other (subject to the exception in § 20.2056(b)-
3, relating to interests contingent on survival for a limited
period).
(2) The power of the surviving spouse must be a power
to appoint the entire interest or a specific portion of it as
unqualified owner (and free of the trust if a trust is in-
volved, or free of the joint tenancy if a joint tenancy is in-
volved) or to appoint the entire interest or a specific por-
tion of it as a part of her estate (and free of the trust if a
trust is involved), that is, in effect, part of her estate (and
free of the trust if a trust is involved), that is, in effect, to
dispose of it to whomsoever she pleases. Thus, if the de-
cedent devised property to a son and the surviving spouse
as joint tenants with right of survivorship and under local
law the surviving spouse has a power of severance exer-
cisable without consent of the other joint tenant, and by
exercising this power could acquire a one-half interest in
the property as a tenant in common, her power of severance
will satisfy the condition set forth in paragraph (a) (3) of
this section that she have a power of appointment in favor
of herself or her estate. However, if the surviving spouse
entered into a binding agreement with the decedent to exer-
cise the power only in favor of their issue, that condition
is not met. An interest passing in trust will not be regarded
as failing to satisfy the condition merely because takers in
default of the surviving spouse's exercise of the power are
designated by the decedent. The decedent may provide
that, in default of exercise of the power, the trust shall
continue for an additional period.
(3) A power is not considered to be a power exercisable
by a surviving spouse alone and in all events as required
by paragraph (a) (4) of this section if the exercise of the
power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest
or a specific portion of it to herself or to her estate requires
the joinder or consent of any other person. The power is
[Vol. 16
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not "exercisable in all events", if it can be terminated dur-
ing the life of the surviving spouse by any event other than
her complete exercise or release of it. Further, a power is
not "exercisable in all events" if it may be exercised for a
limited purpose only. For example, a power which is not
exercisable in the event of the spouse's remarriage is not
exercisable in all events. Likewise, if there are any re-
strictions, either by the terms of the instrument or under
applicable local law, on the exercise of a power to consume
property (whether or not held in trust) for the benefit of
the spouse, the power is not exercisable in all events. Thus,
if a power of invasion is exercisable only for the spouse's
support, or only for her limited use, the power is not exer-
cisable in all events. In order for a power of invasion to
be exercisable in all events, the surviving spouse must have
the unrestricted power exercisable at any time during her
life to use all or any part of the property subject to the
power, and to dispose of it in any manner, including the
power to dispose of it by gift (whether or not she has power
to dispose of it by will).
(4) The power in the surviving spouse is exercisable in
all events only if it exists immediately following the de-
cedent's death. For example, if the power given to the
surviving spouse is exercisable during life, but cannot be
effectively exercised before distribution of the assets by the
executor, the power is not exercisable in all events. Similar-
ly, if the power is exercisable by will, but cannot be effective-
ly exercised in the event the surviving spouse dies before
distribution of the assets by the executor, the power is not
exercisable in all events. However, an interest will not be
disqualified by the mere fact that, in the event the power
is exercised during administration of the estate, distribution
of the property to the appointee will be delayed for the
period of administration. If the power is in existence at
all times following the decedent's death, limitations of a
formal nature will not disqualify an interest. Examples of
formal limitations on a power exercisable during life are
requirements that an exercise must be in a particular form,
that it must be filed with a trust during the spouse's life,
that reasonable notice must be given, or that reasonable in-
tervals must elapse between successive partial exercises.
Examples of formal limitations on a power exercisable by
1961]
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will are that it must be exercised by a will executed by the
surviving spouse after the decedent's death or that exercise
must be by specific reference to the power.
(5) If the surviving spouse has the requisite power to
appoint to herself or her estate, it is immaterial that she
also has one or more lesser powers. Thus, if she has a
testamentary power to appoint to her estate, she may also
have a limited power of withdrawal or of appointment dur-
ing her life. Similarly, if she has an unlimited power of
withdrawal, she may have a limited testamentary power.
Whether or not the language of the will does in fact give the
surviving spouse as broad a power as is required by the fore-
going regulation is a matter of state law. As the Tax Court
pointed out in Allen v. Commissioner," to say otherwise "would
predispose the existence of a body of federal property law of gen-
eral application which does not in fact exist. On the contrary,
legal rights and interests are created by state law". In Tarver v.
Commissioner,'2 the Tax Court construed the will "in the light of
rules of construction prevailing in South Carolina." In the
McGehee case 13 the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals said:
The character and extent of the property rights which
passed to the decedent's husband by her will are to be
determined under law of Florida. Helvering v. Stuart, 317
U.S. 154. The Supreme Court of Florida has established
precedents which point for us the way to decision.
Apparently in some states a gift of a life estate, together with
an unlimited right to consume creates a fee simple. 14 This, how-
ever, is not the law in South Carolina where an estate for life
does not ripen into a fee simple even though the donee has the
power to invade or consume corpus or even appoint the re-
mainder."' Since under South Carolina law the question of what
11. 29 T.C. 465 (1957).
12. 26 T.C. 490 (1956), affd 255 F2d 913 (4th Cir. 1958).
13. McGehee v. United States, supra Note 7 at 821.
14. Horsley v. United States, 160 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1947).
15. Rogers v. Rogers, 221 S.C. 360, 370, 70 S.E.2d 637, 642 (1952) where the
Court said:
It is within the power of a testator to give property to another for life
with full power of disposing of the principal during his life and by will at
his death, and yet what is given is a life estate coupled with a power and
not an absolute gift of personal property or a devise in fee of real estate.
Dallinger v. Merrill, 224 Mass. 534, 113 N.E. 279, 282.
It is well established in this state that the fact that a life estate is given
to one coupled with the power to consume the corpus does not enlarge the
estate into a fee or an absolute estate.
See also Shevlin v. Colony Lutheran Church, 227 S.C. 598, 88 S.E.2d 674
(1955) ; Lynch v. Lynch, 161 S.C. 170, 159 S.E. 26 (1931) ; Forest v. Jennings,
107 S.C. 117, 92 S.E. 189 (1917).
[Vol. 16
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estate or power was given by a decedent's will is essentially one
of the intent of the decedent, the relevant facts will differ ma-
terially according to whether the power is over the remainder
or whether the power is to invade or consume principal, and
the cases will be discussed with this distinction in mind.
In the Tarver case,10 the will provided that the surviving
spouse should have the right to withdraw the corpus from the
trust "for her use and/or the use or benefit of our children as
she deems advisable." The court held that since the will as a
whole showed great solicitude for the testator's children and
since the remainder over was to them, the power given the sur-
viving wife to withdraw corpus was meant to be limited to that
amount necessary for her own or the children's welfare. The
court said:
It seems clear to us, when the will is read as a whole, that
the decedent intended that the surviving spouse should
have the right to draw out only so much of the corpus as
might be necessary for her personal use or the use or benefit
of the children, and that he contemplated that there would
be an unused part of the corpus which should be retained
for the benefit of his children .... 17
In Landers v. Commissioner,'8 it was similarly held that in
Georgia a remainder over showed that the testator intended
that the power given the surviving spouse to invade should be
held limited by her need. Where any qualifying words are used
in connection with the power to invade, even though such words
are so broad that they will preclude any charitable deduction
for a remainder over, such as amounts necessary for the "com-
fort", "welfare" or "well-being", the surviving spouse's power to
invade will be deemed a limited one and the marital deduction
not allowed. 19
Even where there are no restrictions whatever placed in the
will it has been held that where state law prohibits the sur-
viving spouse from wasting corpus, the interest will not qualify
for the marital deduction. In Commissioner v. Lincoln-Rochester
Trust Co.,20 the court said:
16. Estate of Tarvek v. Commissioner, Supra, Note 12 at 496.
17. Id., at 504.
18. 38 T.C. 828 (1962).
19. See J. J. Semms, 32 T.C. 1218 (1959); E. W. Noble, 31 T.C. 888 (1958).
A recent decision on this point is Piatt v. United States, 321 F.2d 79 (6th Cir.
1963).
20. 297 F2d 891 at 893, (2d Cir. 1962).
1961]
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While the widow might consume the principal she might
(under New York law) only do so in good faith, and had
no power to dispose of any portion not consumed, by gift
or appointment to herself or others by instrument, corpus
not so consumed being governed by testator's will.
Many courts have said that a life estate in the surviving
spouse coupled with a power "to use" the property with remain-
ders over is not sufficient to comply with the regulation as to
the marital deduction because a right "to use" or "consume"
does not imply a right to give away the property.21 Thus, there
is a failure to comply with the language of the regulation, though
not of the statute.
The words "use" or "consume" unless coupled with a power
to dispose may not indicate an unlimited right. There are
apparently no South Carolina cases on this point, but the Su-
preme Court of Georgia has discussed the question in its opinion
in Comer v. Citizens & Southerm NationaZ Bank,22 where the
Court said:
We may here consider further the true scope of the words,
"to be used and disposed of by him during his life as he
may see proper." The verb "use", standing alone, does not
imply a particularly broad power of disposition. See In re
Dorgan's Estate (D.C.) 237 Fed. 507, 508, where there was
a definite life estate, a definite remainder, and a power in
the life tenant "to use" without let or hindrance. It was
held that the language did not embrace a broad power of
disposal for purposes other than the beneficiary's own use,
although there was a further provision that she might "sell
and convey any real estate left by me". Clearly the right
to give the property away was not covered. But the word
"use" must always be regarded in the particular connection
in which it appears, 66 C.J. 66; and, when coupled with
the words "and dispose of", the scope is greatly broadened.
The expression "dispose of" usually includes a power of
gift. 18 C.J. 1280, and citations. When we add the words
"as he may see proper", additional breadth is given. The
entire statement, "to be used as he may see proper", is, to
our minds, almost as broad as testator could make it. We
construe the phrase, "to be used and disposed of by him
21. E.g., Estate of Landers v. Commissioner, Supra Note 18.
22. 182 Ga. 1 at 3, 185 S.E. 72 at 82 (1936).
[Vol. 16
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during his life as he may see proper," as applied to Hugh
M., Jr., to mean that during his life Hugh M., Jr. had the
power to consume, sell, mortgage, or give away, the fee in
this property as he might desire.
On the other hand, where the intent of the testator to give
his surviving spouse the right to consume or use the property
is very clear and there are no restraints by reason of state law,
it will be held that the power qualifies for the marital deduction.
Thus, in Estate of Bourke,2 3 it was held that where the surviving
spouse was given the right to request any amount of trust prin-
cipal, even the whole thereof, it qualified for the marital de-
duction, and that it was immaterial under California law that
there were remainders over. In Hoffman v. McGinnes,24 it was
held that in Pennsylvania that where a surviving spouse was
given the right "to use and spend any or all of the principal of
my estate, if she so desires," the spouse had an unlimited power
"exercisable alone in all events" and qualified for the marital
deduction.
Both of the above cases involved trusts. Regulations section
20.2056(b) (5) (g) (2) specifically provides that:
An interest passing in trust will not be regarded as failing
to satisfy the condition merely because takers in default of
surviving spouse's exercise of power are designated.
However, regardless of a trust, and where the surviving spouse's
interest is a life estate, some cases hold that unless there is a
specific restriction the interest qualifies.
In McGehee v. United States2 5 the court said that a life estate
with power of use and disposition in the surviving spouse would
qualify for the marital deduction. In Boyd v. Gray26 it was
held2 7 that property given to the surviving spouse for life with
power to use and disposition was sufficient under Kentucky
law for qualification under the marital deduction.
Although several of the above cases hold that a power to con-
sume or invade will be considered unlimited unless some words
of limitation are implied or the state law will prohibit the spouse
from "wasting" the property (which is not the case in South
23. 19 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 496 (1960).
24. 277 F.2d 598 (3rd Cir. 1960).
25. McGehee v. United States, supra, note 7.
26. Boyd v. Gray, supra, note 7.
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Carolina), the Commissioner has not agreed with any of these
cases. To avoid litigation in this field, it is suggested that in
creating a power to invade, which will qualify for the marital
deduction, that the power be coupled with a power of disposition
sufficiently broad to cover the giving of the property away.
This would seem to be particularly advisable where there are
remainders over to children or other natural objects of a testa-
tor's bounty. It has been suggested by the 2nd Circuit Court of
Appeals 28 that any problems in this connection may be avoided
by using the statutory language. The statute, however, merely
says what shall be done, not how it shall be done. That is left
up to the draftsman of the will.
There are no particular problems in connection with the power
to dispose of the remainder of the property. The draftsman,
however, must be careful to be sure that there are no hidden
traps. For example, in In re Mervin G. Pierpont,29 the testator
established a trust for his widow which in every respect complied,
as to payment of income, with the marital deduction rules. The
will also provided that the corpus of the trust "shall be paid
over free of this trust in such a manner and proportions as my
said wife shall designate under her last will and testament".80
Under Maryland law the language of this power did not include
the widow's estate. For this reason the power was held to be
insufficient to qualify the widow's share for the marital de-
duction.
Ordinarily, Lallah's power of appointment would be
deemed general; that is, there would be no limitations on
her choice of appointees, including her estate or her credi-
tors. See Morgan v. Commissioner (40-1 USTC § 9210),
309 U.S. 78 (1940). But the scope of Lallah's power of ap-
pointment is to be determined under the law of Maryland,
and, as this Court has recognized in Estate of William
C. Allen (Dec. 22, 702), 29 T.C. 465 (1957), the donee of an
otherwise general power of appointment does not, under
Maryland law, have the right to appoint property subject
to the power to his estate or for payment of his debts, absent
language expressly conferring such right in the instrument
by which the power of appointment is granted.
28. May v. United States, 283 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1960).
29. 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1515 (1962).
30. Id. at 1516.
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Because decedent in his will did not expressly grant to
Lallah the right in question, it would appear that re-
spondent's determination must be sustained ....81
The draftsman does not have to worry about this particular
problem in South Carolina. Here, a general power includes
the right to appoint property to an estate. In Price v. Ouija
Realty Co.,3 2 it was held that where the appontee left all of the
appointee's estate (which would include the appointed property)
to her executor, to build a wing to a hospital, the power was
properly executed. Some years before her death the decedent's
uncle had left certain property to her for life with the remainder
(if she had no children) "to such person or persons" as she
"in her last will and testament shall appoint". The decedent's
will provided that the residue of her estate was given to her
executor to build a wing to the hospital. The suit was brought
by the decedent's executor to confirm his right of sale. It was
contended that the power of appointment given the decedent by
her uncle ran only to a "person or persons" and not to the
decedent's executor. The court rejected this contention, saying:
Defendant's construction is too literal and technical. It
fails to give effect to the necessary implication arising from
the language quoted (the residuary clause of decedent's
will) from which the intention to appoint her executor to
succeed to the estate appears with sufficient clearness.33
Of course, the validity of the bequiest under the marital de-
duction section of the IRC depends upon the power, not upon
whether or not it is exercised. However, statutory limitations
upon the right of exercise may be a limitation upon the power
itself. In South Carolina, the statute34 providing for the exer-
cise of a power contains no limitations whatever. It reads:
A general devise of the real estate of a testator or of the
real estate of such testator in any place or in the occupation
of any person mentioned in the will or otherwise described
in a general manner, shall be construed to include any real
estate or any real estate to which such description shall ex-
tend, as the case may be, which the testator may have power
to appoint in any manner he may think proper and shall op-
31. Id. at 1519.
32. 113 S.C. 556, 101 S.E. 819 (1919).
33. Id. at 559, 101 S.E. at 820.
34. S.C. CODE § 19-233 (1962).
19641
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erate as an execution of such power unless a contrary inten-
tion shall appear upon the face of the will. In like manner a
bequest of the personal estate of the testator or any bequest of
personal property described in a general manner shall be con-
strued to include any personal estate or any personal estate to
which such description shall extend, as the case may be,
which the testator may have power to appoint in any man-
ner he may think proper and shall operate as an execution
of such power unless a contrary intention shall appear upon
the face of the will.
3. THE NEW REQUIREMENT OF THE IRS WHERE
THE MARITAL DEDUCTION IS TAKEN BY MEANS
OF A PECUNIARY FORMIULA.
Where a surviving spouse is left specific property, either
outright or in trust with a qualifying power of appointment,
or is left a fractional interest in specific property or the
residuary estate, this discussion in inapplicable. However, it is
common practice in South Carolina for a surviving spouse to
be left a marital share exactly equal to 0o% of the adjusted
gross estate less other property in such estate passing to her by
reason of the death of the decedent.
The writer has customarily favored this formula clause.
Through its use, an attorney reduces the risk resulting from a
client's failure to review periodically his estate plan. However,
the IRS holds that the satisfaction of a pecuniary bequest in
assets at distribution values will result in a recognized gain or
loss as a consequence of the distribution.3 5 Thus a formula
clause may be coupled with a direction to the executor to dis-
tribute assets in satisfaction of bequests at estate tax Values,
rather than at distribution values. This permits a non-taxable
and flexible allocation of assets between marital shares.
For many years it has been ruled that if the executor is au-
thorized to satisfy the amount of this bequest with property of
the estate at its distribution value there will be a gain or loss
to the estate of any appreciation or depreciation in the estate
assets used to satisfy the bequest. To avoid this possible tax
35. Rev. Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 325 as clarified by Rev. Rul. 60-87,
1960-1 Cum. Bull. 286. The rationale of the ruling is that the formula results
in a dollar amount bequest to the surviving spouse which is satisfied by the
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upon the estate most wills provide that the executor shall satisfy
the bequest at estate tax values.
The IRS now takes the view that this gives the executor dis-
cretionary power to satisfy the marital deduction with assets
worth less than the amount of deduction allowed and that un-
less this possibility is eliminated the marital deduction, in such
case, will not be allowed.
In a preliminary announcement 6 the following example was
given:
EXAMPLE. At the time of his death, a decedent's estate
consists of two blocks of stock, each worth $100,000. His
will leaves his widow half of his estate or $100,000; but the
executor is empowered to satisfy this bequest with assets
valued at $100,000 for estate tax purposes. When the execu-
tor is ready to distribute the estate, one block of stock is
worth only $75,000 and the other is worth $125,000 under de-
cedent's will, the executor could give the widow either block
of the stock, or $100,000 in cash.
The announcement continued:
The executor's power, in the above example, to shift the
interest of the widow in the estate in relation to the other
beneficial interests would not meet the Code's requirements
for a marital deduction. It has been argued that the exe-
cutor would be required by local law to make an equitable
distribution to all parties, but this point has not been clearly
established by statute or court decision. However, under
Rec. Proc. 64-19, the IRS will allow the marital deduction
if the executor agrees that he will distribute to the widow
an amount equal to a fair share of the value of all the assets
on the date of distribution; and if the widow agrees that if
she accepts any lesser amount, she will treat the difference
as a gift to the other beneficiaries.
The IRS has refused to say why it will refuse to allow the
marital deduction under such circumstances, but it has cited
the recent case of L. R. Jackson et al. v. United States37 holding
that a California's widow's allowance does not qualify for the
marital deduction since at the time of testator's death it is not
a "vested right" (although it became vested later after a pro-
36. Rev. Rul. 64-19, 1964 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 2, at 18.
37. 376 U.S. 503 (1963).
19641
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss4/2
SoUTH CAnoUNA LAW REv-W[
bate court order was entered making the allowance). The IRS
has evidently interpreted this decision as requiring a definite
amount for a "vesting". We suggest that there are situations
where the precise amount of a marital deduction can be deter-
mined only after administration has been completed-such as
where a residuary estate, or a portion thereof, goes to a surviving
spouse but only after taxes and administration expenses have
been deducted. It is possible that the IRS is somewhat con-
fused here between a bequest which is terminable and a bequest
which is vested but subject, under circumstances, to a partial
divestment. Revenue Procedure 64-19 says that wills or trusts
making use of a pecuniary formula which may be satisfied with
assets at estate tax values and dated prior to October 1, 1964,
will nevertheless qualify for the marital deduction if both the
surviving spouse and the executor or trustee execute and file
agreements regarding the distribution of estate assets to or for
the surviving spouse. However, if the instrument is dated after
October 1, 1964, the agreements will not be sufficient, the will
or trust itself must prohibit the satisfaction of the marital de-
duction bequest with depreciated assets.
In the Revenue Procedure, the form of such agreements is
set forth as follows:
38
Section 5. Form of Agreements.
.01. By Surviving Spouse.
In the event of the allowance by or on behalf of the Com-
missioner or Internal Revenue of a marital deduction for
a pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust to me or on my
behalf of $ , claimed in connection with
the settlement of the Federal estate tax liability of the
estate of , and as part of the con-
sideration for this settlement, I hereby agree that in the
event cash and other property accepted in full satisfaction
of this bequest or transfer in trust is not fairly representa-
tive of my proportionate share of any net appreciation in
the value, to the date or dates of distribution, of all prop-
erty then available for distribution in satisfaction of such
pecuniary bequest or transfer, the difference in value will
be treated as a transfer or transfers by gift as of the date,
or dates, of distribution, and a Federal gift tax return
or returns with respect to such transfer or transfers by gift
38. Rev. Rul. 64-19, 1964 Int. Rev. BulL No. 15, at 30-33.
[Vol. 16
15
Burton: Some Marital Deduction Problems for the South Carolina Lawyer
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SuravEY oF SOUTH CArOLIxA LAW




.02 By Executor or Trustee.
In the event of the allowance by or on behalf of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue of a marital deduction for a
pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust of $
claimed in connection with the settlement of the Federal
estate tax liability of the estate of
and as part of the consideration for this settlement, I here-
by agree that the assets to be distributed in satisfaction of
this bequest or transfer in trust will be selected in such
manner that the cash and other property distributed will
have an aggregate fair market value fairly representative
of the pecuniary legatee's (or transferee's) proportionate
share of the appreciation or depreciation in the value to
the date, or dates, of distribution of all property then
available for distribution in satisfaction of such pecuniary
bequest or transfer. I further agree that, within six months
after the final distribution of cash and other property in
satisfaction of the marital deduction pecuniary bequest or
transfer in trust subsequent to the date of this agreement,
the cash and other property available for distribution in
satisfaction of the marital deduction pecuniary bequest or
transfer at each date of distribution, and fair market value
of each such asset at each date of distribution.
Trustee, or
Executor of the Will of
It is almost certain that the right of the IRS to issue such a
ruling under section 2056 of the code will be contested. A cor-
porate executor or trustee may be unwilling to execute the agree-
ment on the ground that it would be improper for a fiduciary
to agree in advance as to how it will exercise discretionary
powers of distribution. However, it is difficult to say that an
executor would not have such authority when the execution and
filing of the agreement may result in the saving of a substantial
tax. A more bothersome question arises as to whether a sur-
1964]
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viving spouse, without children, would be properly advised to
sign the agreement. If she has no pecuniary interest in the
balance of the estate (that is, the non-marital deduction share)
it would be immaterial to her how much tax has to be paid on
the estate. By signing and filing the agreement the spouse may
be agreeing to the reduction of a tax which does not affect
her interest but at the same time at the cost of a possible im-
position of a larger tax upon her own estate.
The need for Revenue Procedure 61-19 can seriously be ques-
tioned. While values of estate assets must be based on tax
values for determining the amount of the marital deduction,
very few wills provide specifically that the executor is authorized
or empowered to use estate tax values when distributing assets to
the spouse in satisfaction of the marital share. Moreover, even
where the executor is given discretion in this regard it would
seem that he must make the distribution impartially and in
good faith.3 9 Revenue Procedure 64-19 does not recognize this
duty of impartiality.
The ruling poses a problem for attorneys who have drawn
wills falling within its ambit. Should attorneys who have
drawn wills using the pecuniary formula and authorizing an
executor to satisfy the bequest by a distribution of assets at
estate tax values, inform the client of the change in IRS po-
sition? It can hardly be assumed that the clients will be ad-
vised of the present IRS view by anyone else, and there is
no assurance that the executor or attorney for the client's estate
will know of the IRS requirement when the estate is being ad-
ministered. An attorney must prepare wills in accordance with
law then existing, but can hardly be charged with the obligation
of advising the client of changes occuring during future years.
Moreover, would it not be improper as possibly a solicitation of
legal business for a lawyer to suggest that he might re-draw
the will or prepare a codicil? These questions are difficult ones
but the writer personally leans to the view that the attorney
should advise the client of the change--in an objective way which
does not suggest that he re-draw the will or prepare a codicil.
In his treatise on "Legal Ethics", 40 Mr. Henry S. Drinker
says:
39. ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 183-187 (2d ed. 1956). See Carrier v. Carrier, 226
N.Y. 114, 123 N.E. 135 (App. Div. 1919). See Lauritzen, Marital Deduction
Bequest-Current Proble.m and Drafting Suggestions, 8 Tax Counselor's Quar-
terly 125 (1964).
40. DRINKER, LEGAL ETIrcs, 254 (1953).
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Information to Clients as to Changes in the Law
While a lawyer may send to his clients a summary of
recent legislation, or a suggestion based on recent decisions
or legislation clearly in the interest of the particular client,
he may not properly send to clients generally a notice of an
estate planning service which is capable of interpretation
as a bid for employment.
He may advise one whose will he has drawn to review it,
by reason of changes in the law or of his personal affairs
and beneficiaries.
A lawyer may properly advise clients of new statutes and
send them pertinent memoranda in reference to changes in
the law, in a way that does not smack of advertising, but a
personal letter to the client is in better taste than a circular,
it being improper to do this by a folder or confidential
report analyzing Government regulations.
Note that Mr. Drinker suggests that a personal letter would
be better than a circularized notice.
How should the matter be handled in a codicil or a new will?
If the transfer of assets is at distribution-rather than estate
tax-values, there could be no objection to the formula clause,
but in such case there would be a taxable gain or loss to the
estate of any appreciation or depreciation in values during this
period. Despite the possibility of a taxable gain in this situation,
it might be better to use a pecuniary formula to obtain the ad-
vantages of the built-in adjuster mentioned before. It has been
suggested that the transfer of assets to or for the surviving
spouse pursuant to the ruling might give rise to a taxable gain
or loss. However, the writer is satisfied that this is not the
case. There is no realization and consequently there can be con-
stitutionally no gain or loss. 4
1
If the will contains a clause somewhat as follows:
Assets distributed to my said wife (or to the Trustees) in
satisfaction of this bequest shall be of an aggregate value
fairly representative of the appreciation or depreciation in
value of all property in my estate available for distribution
in satisfaction of such bequest,
it is believed that the ruling would be complied with, and the
marital deduction allowed, but it raises the problem of valuation
41. Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11 (1929).
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of assets. It would seem that a valuation must be made as of the
distribution date as well as at the estate tax date. Of course, the
problem may be avoided in some cases by leaving specific items
of property or a fraction of the residue of the estate to the sur-
viving spouse. However, it must be borne in mind that the
fraction of residue may give rise to a very difficult problem of
computing the estate tax.
42
It is not the use of the pecuniary formula which the IRS
objects to, it is the specific authorization given the executor
to satisfy the marital bequest with estate assets at estate tax
values. The fact that the will uses the estate tax values in com-
puting the amount of the marital bequest does not mean that
such values may be used in determining the value of assets
which are transferred in satisfaction of the bequest. This dis-
tinction is of the utmost importance and probably if the dis-
tinction is kept in mind Revenue Procedure 64-19 will have
little application.
42. If the estate tax can only be computed after the marital deduction, and
the marital deduction depends upon the amount of estate tax, a complicated
geometric formula must be adopted. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (6)-4 (c) (4).
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